Donald Trump faces the end of his first year of his second term in the White House. In recent months, the Republican has once again shaken up the international board with a foreign policy marked by the ‘America First’ doctrine, which includes new tariffs and the review of trade agreements, even with traditional partners. Added to this are the hardening of immigration and a renewed presence in the Caribbean, two keys to understanding a Government whose decisions arouse notable interest outside the United States. LA RAZÓN has been able to talk in Madrid with Joshua Trevinosenior advisor to the America First Policy Institute (AFPI), one of the most influential think tanks in Trump’s circle, to analyze these policies.
Q: What is Europe’s role within the ‘America First’ movement?
There is a common misunderstanding that there is no room for allies within the ‘America First’ doctrine. That is completely false. We always say that ‘America First’ does not mean ‘America alone.’ I would propose it as an adequate orientation of the Government towards the well-being of its people. And to the extent that our allies and partners adopt that same orientation, they too will be stronger. So yes, of course there is room for allies and alliances within America First. It is not an isolationist doctrine.
Europe has been critical to America’s defense almost from the beginning. What has changed, especially in the Trump years—and what had to change—is the degree of burden sharing. The United States, unlike Europe as a whole, has commitments around the world. Europe does not guarantee the security of the Western Hemisphere. Europe does not guarantee the security of the Indo-Pacific. It can play a role, but ultimately Europe must take care of Europe. And Europe can do much more for its own defense than it has done so far.
I think there is a general understanding that the United States is the indispensable nation when it comes to European security. But Europe can make weapons. Europe can deploy armies. Europe can do strategic planning. And what we are seeing is that the United States is asking the Europeans to do that, because we have our hands full with many other places in the world.
“America First is not an isolationist doctrine”
Q: What assessment do you make of the Trump Administration’s tariff policy?
I believe we must understand tariff policy as part of the effort to return industrialization to the United States. That is the approach from which I see it. And it is indisputable that we are not against trade, nor free trade, nor reasonable trade. But free trade, to begin with, must be with other free markets, something that did not happen before the Trump Administration, especially with China. And it was necessary to reorient trade for the benefit of the nation.
Many of these questions remain to be seen. We haven’t even been in administration for a full year. But I will say this: anyone who is surprised that a country uses all available foreign policy tools is not living in reality. I also sense this idea that America should be guided by “empathy” or “feeling” above anything else. But that is not a fair request, because Europeans do not act motivated by sentiment either. No country does it. Whether there is realism behind much of the policy—whether the policy works or not—is a different calculus. But you certainly cannot accuse the Trump White House of not applying its principles consistently and uniformly.
Q: Do you think Europe is complying in terms of security?
No, I don’t think so. Europe has improved on national security. Definitely. With some exceptions, of course. The fact that Spain has not reached the target of 5% spending on NATO is a problem. But, in general terms, it must be recognized that Europe – late, very late – is taking a step forward and has acted admirably, especially with regard to the defense industry and national security.
Where Europe falls behind is in recruitment, the size of its armies and similar issues. You need men to form an armed forces, and that is a serious problem. You also need functioning democratic societies. In the absence of effective conscription, you need states and societies that deserve to be defended, and that is not true across Europe.
Q: And in terms of immigration?
No, it’s not. Europe has a unique and valuable history that has given rise, almost uniquely in the world, to societies based on law, freedom, values and tradition, rooted in an explicitly Christian, largely Catholic, heritage. That is unparalleled and should be a source of pride. For European states and societies to dilute, stifle or abandon that foundation – whether by imposing left-wing secularism or by importing millions of Muslims, which is happening – is an unprecedented act of civic and cultural vandalism.
“Where Europe falls behind is in recruitment, the size of its armies and similar issues”
Q: Donald Trump faces his second and final term. Will the ‘Make America Great Again’ movement continue without him?
Donald Trump was, for the historical moment, the indispensable man. It was the catalyst for everything that came after. And I don’t think there’s any chance we would have seen what happened in the last decade without him. But I also believe that it is indisputable that he has built a movement that will last beyond his figure. That will be his greatest legacy, and it is a merit that fully belongs to him.
We, at the America First Policy Institute, would not exist without the persistence of that movement. So our expectation is that a generation from now the MAGA movement will still be talked about, and we will still live within the renewed conservative coalition—an American majority—that he helped create.
Q: The Republican Party appears to have suffered two setbacks. First Mamdani’s victory in New York, and more recently the appearance of Donald Trump in Jeffrey Epstein’s emails. Do you think it will be negatively affected in the midterm elections?
I don’t think it’s possible to say what the situation will be like in a year. What I can say is that the ideological movement will continue to be strong. And given how many times Donald Trump, in particular, has been on the ropes and gotten back up, anyone who writes him off—or who writes off any race in which he is directly involved, as I think he will do in the midterms—is probably betting against the odds.
Q: The US has increased its presence in the Caribbean, what is behind this apparent anti-drug operation?
I don’t think anyone on the outside really knows what’s going on, nor should they. The only people who know with certainty what is happening—in relation to Venezuela and in relation to the southern Caribbean—are those in the White House and in the Department of Defense. So we will know what they decide to tell us. What I can say is that even if nothing else happens apart from what is already happening—namely, the US Navy sinking drug trafficking vessels in the Caribbean—the operation is already a success on its own terms. And that is simply because it has been useful, positive and good for Americans to see, for once, the US Armed Forces employed in defending American communities, something that does not always happen. During the Biden years there was a real complaint: that the United States defended the Ukrainian border but not its own. That is behind us.
Q: What is the current state of relations between the United States and Mexico?
Mexico is one of our biggest problems. It is governed by a regime that has maintained an alliance for years both with elements of the most radical left and with the drug traffickers themselves. So, when some say that Mexico is practically a narco-state, I mostly agree. And, of course, Mexico is both the conduit and often the source of most of the drugs that kill Americans, as well as much of the trafficking activity that harms not only Americans, but also Latin Americans and many others. Mexico has played a monstrous role in the crisis that has brought us to this point.
That said, it seems pretty clear that, for now, the Administration has decided to use more of a “carrot and stick” strategy with the Mexicans. And I don’t know what the future holds. I do know that we had the option and plenty of reasons to have been much harsher with Mexico than we have been, and that the Mexican State has earned that discredit. But we have chosen not to do that, and my hope is that that decision is because they have given us certain things that we needed in terms of security that they were not willing to give us before.
Q: Is US support for Ukraine sufficient?
Yes, I think so. But of course, the question assumes something: what does “enough” mean? How do we define “winning the war”? what is the victory condition? I don’t think anyone has defined it. What I can say is that I think the United States is being more generous to Ukraine under President Trump than it was under President Biden. Let’s not forget that Ukraine survived the initial 2022 invasion specifically thanks to the personal anti-tank weapons that President Trump sent and that Barack Obama refused to send. Similarly, in terms of intelligence sharing, target approval, and provision of long-range weaponry, the Trump Administration has done a great deal to turn Ukraine into a strategic counterweight to Russia, something no one expected three years ago. We are doing a lot, and at a certain point it is up to Ukrainians to take advantage of that support.
We must also take into account the American pressure on the Europeans to increase their manufacturing, weapons and defense capacity in general as a form of aid to Ukraine. That would not have happened without pressure from the United States. And thanks to that pressure, the Europeans can also support the Ukrainians.
“The Administration has decided to use more the “carrot and stick” strategy with the Mexicans”
Q: Should the Trump Administration be tougher on Vladimir Putin?
If the Department of Defense and the White House consider it to be in American interest, yes. The sanctions regime is tougher than ever. There is always, in some sense, more that can be done. The question is what is prudent to do, what is within the limits of viable foreign policy. And I think it’s easy to say that the Trump Administration has taken those options to the maximum within the framework of American interest at this time. Russia is an economy that, by all estimates, is close to collapse: it cannot access its assets abroad, its energy sector is shrinking, the sanctions regime under the Trump Administration is much harsher than under Biden, and the supply of weapons to Ukraine has given Ukraine a real strategic strike capability. At this point I have a hard time thinking what else we could do except go directly to war with Russia, which is clearly not in anyone’s prudent interest.
Q: It has been a very intense first year for the Trump Administration. What can we expect in the future?
What a difference between the first and second terms. In the first, President Trump—and the movement around him—was still trying to dominate Washington, D.C. The other side was able to stop much of the agenda simply because of its superior command of personnel, policies, and processes. None of that is true now. This Trump Administration returned to power well prepared to exercise it. And what they did was completely redefine the standard of what a presidential transition or preparation to govern should look like. And that is a credit to the campaign. It is 100% credit to the president. My impression is that we continue to see legislative and political work in November 2025 that is a direct consequence of that intensive preparation that the Trump team carried out in the previous years, one, two or three years before. My expectation is that that will continue for the next three years.