While the doctrine of regime change has not been popular among Western statesmen in recent decades, President Trump’s interventions in Venezuela and Iran They have made it one of the hottest political topics. Although the American leader refrains from openly declaring that regime change is the main objective of his actions, he noted that in Venezuela “we are now in charge” and in Iran “the regime change is already complete.” These statements, in my opinion, are greatly exaggerated: In both Caracas and Tehran the political systems have not changed and the ideology of the new leaders resembles that of those who are no longer here.
Many analysts had argued that both results reveal the overestimation of Western technological superiority and its ability to destroy both governance mechanisms and bureaucratic structures through rapid interventions or airstrikes. I would say that this should have been learned a long time ago: after the conflict in Yugoslavia and the experience of Afghanistan and Iraq, It should be obvious that massive ground operations are needed to change a country’s political system (and even this would not guarantee successful “nation-building” thereafter). But, in my opinion, the most recent cases can add something new to these rather banal conclusions.
From a mid-2026 perspective, it appears that The biggest mistake made by American leaders was failing to constantly assess the power and influence of different forces against the regime. and compare them with those of pro-government forces. Traditionally strong advocates of popular democracy and human rights, Western politicians tended to focus on pro-democratic forces within authoritarian nations and on liberal émigré groups outside them. It seemed a wise bet since in Venezuela, for example, the opposition never once came close to defeating the ruling clique in national elections, and in Iran a large-scale popular uprising broke out in early 2026.
Both the Venezuelan and Iranian diasporas, led by presidential hopeful Maria Corina Machado and heir to the Persian throne Reza Pahlavi, are numerous and made up of millions of people familiar with the Western lifestyle, but after all, Neither the local nor the emigrant opposition played a decisive role in the regime change efforts. It could be explained by a fairly simple reason: current authoritarian states such as Venezuela, Iran, Russia or Cuba are governed not only by “national leaders”, but by a fairly large group of people representing the “security services” (from Iran’s Pasdaran to Russia’s FSB) who exercise effective control over a significant part of their nations’ economies and possess unprecedented powers to intervene in people’s lives. Besides, Around these leaders, huge groups of cronies consolidate control over vast economic assets and financial channels.. The activities of all these groups go against not only moral principles but also large sectors of their national legislature.
Therefore, everyone will fight for their power and privileges until the end, simply not caring about the possible casualties. However, all of these regimes produce enormous economic hardship for their own subjects and create conflict within elites through the redistribution of assets, marginalizing once powerful groups, and creating increasing uncertainty due to their unpredictable actions. Those members of the elites who are threatened by the system they effectively serve must be seen as the most valuable allies of the external forces that challenge the regime. Recent history provides dozens of examples demonstrating that changes within the elite are the most fluid and effective.
One can remember the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev and its former republics, all headed by former members of the nomenklatura; or the case of Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milosevic, who was successfully sent to The Hague by his own lieutenants; or even the recent (albeit much milder) case of Viktor Orban being overthrown by another former senior member of his own party. But, instead of co-opting the strongmen’s allies or igniting endless deadly disputes between them, the West is trying to subject hundreds of senior officials from Venezuela, Iran, Russia or Cuba to sanctions, thus uniting them behind their self-proclaimed leaders.
To make a long story short, I would suggest that The strength of the Iranian or Russian regimes should not be explained by the unity of their elites but rather by the West’s unwillingness to divide them. If Western powers provided an “exit strategy” for Russian billionaires, they could become much less pro-Putin than they are now. If US or European sanctions were suddenly lifted on several dozen high-level officials, all of them would immediately become the subject of scrutiny and, unbanned, could unite against the supreme leaders. If Western statesmen were focused, for example, on disuniting Russia or undermining Iran, they should reach out not to the “ethnic activists” who fled their countries years ago, but to the current executives of the ethnic enclaves or their representatives. It is time to recognize that émigré liberals can simply walk around with some slogans in Berlin, New York or London displaying old newly designed white, blue and white Iranian or Russian flags, but they are absolutely useless when it comes to any attempt at regime change, since none of them want to act as revolutionaries.
The conflict between Western democracies and rising totalitarian regimes may well become the most important international confrontation of the coming decades. It is much more crucial than the once famous “War on Terror” ever was. Therefore, the West now urgently needs a new strategy for dealing with these regimes, a strategy that should be based not on a large-scale confrontation like that which occurred during World War II or even in the Cold War years, but rather on the use of the West’s soft power to undermine enemy states. Since the late 1980s, the world has become open and market-oriented, and a profound change occurred that must be considered: the elites of authoritarian nations became rich and integrated into global elite society.
Nowadays, None of the states that can be described as a new “axis of evil” has a perfectly united and consolidated elite.so the only reliable resistance strategy against them is to provoke internal confrontations that overthrow these regimes backed by economic problems and popular discontent. Without the support of a part of the elite groups, these systems cannot be questioned, and this seems to be the most important lesson of recent events in Latin America and the Middle East.
*Vladislav Inozemtsev is co-founder and member of the Advisory Board of the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe in Nicosia (Cyprus)