Last week, Ukrainian forces invaded Russia’s Kursk regioncapturing up to 1,000 square kilometers of its territory,with at least 44 cities and settlementsand forcing the defending troops to retreat, if not flee in disarray. The offensive, predicted by Russian military intelligence but surprisingly ignored by the high command of the Armed Forces, It made the president very angry and nervousVladimir Putin and was seen by many as a potential game changer in the ongoing war.
In my opinion, the current offensive should be called a bold and intelligent move by Ukraine, since half a year ago I argued that 2024 would become a crucial moment for both Moscow and Kyivso “Ukraine, and the coalition supporting it, should try to change the course of events as drastically as possible” (LR, 24.02.2024, p. 15). It happened, and now it is time to reflect on it. What could be the immediate and long-term results? the first intrusion of a regular foreign army deep into Russian territory since World War II.
What can be said is that the attack demonstrated something that was already known in advance: Putin’s domestic policy aims to keep the Russian population out of the ongoing war and encourage it to live as if it did not exist. Thus, the Kremlin ignored most of the disturbing news that came from the border recently and paid little attention to the quality of the “fortifications” built in the neighbouring regions for which Moscow allocated billions of rubles last year.
Putin prefers to downplay almost any challengeeven if such negligence cost hundreds of lives, than to overstate it, interrupting the lethargic sleep of his subjects throughout the country. Moreover, I would say that He seems so mad about war that he won’t change his course because thousands of their compatriots have to suffer the forced evacuation of their cities and the destruction of their homes.
The incursion was described by many as a bold attempt either to raise the stakes in future negotiations between Ukraine and Russia or to make Russian troops fighting in Donbas to be relocated to new positionsBut what we see suggests that those hopes may be unfounded.
On the one hand, The attack caused little change in the Kremlin’s behavior.:Not only did Putin refrain from calling the “special military operation” a war, but he called the Ukrainian advance a “provocation” and ordered the ongoing events to be declared a “federal emergency situation” to which an “anti-terrorist operation” should be the best response.
Not only has martial law not been declared in the Kursk region, but the regional gubernatorial elections scheduled for September 6-8 have not been postponed or cancelled either. Russian federal media have allegedly been ordered to divert their attention from the fighting on Russian territory, and, in my opinion, History will be treated as insignificant until the Ukrainians advance towards the city of Kursk and appear near the Kursk nuclear power plant (which, I would say, is unlikely to happen), or until Russian forces manage to expel them.
On the other hand, There are no signs that the Russian command will loosen its grip on key cities in Donbaswhich the Ukrainians are defending with their last strength. It also seems that the Ukrainian forces are trying to expand the front of their offensive in the Kursk, Belgorod and even Bryansk regions, but such a task might require too many soldiers and weapons that cannot be deployed here for a long time, since if all these regions are attacked on a large scale, The total duration of fighting between Russia and Ukraine would almost double.
Some analysts and activists speculate about a “march to Moscow” or the establishment of a “Kursk People’s Republic” similar to those created by the Kremlin in eastern Ukraine in 2014. I would consider both options unrealistic: an advance on Moscow needs at least more than 100,000 troops and may provoke retaliation, including a tactical nuclear strike; and the proclamation of an autonomous entity needs some supporters among the population of the occupied lands, which has not been evident at all in recent weeks.
With this in mind, I would say that the offensive could be short-livedand cannot be seriously developed since the Ukrainian Army can face encirclements unless it expands the front line to 100-200 kilometers wide, but in this case it would need twice as many men as it now deploys along the entire Russian front line.
Russian capabilities these days remain quite robust.and the Ukrainian success, I repeat, comes primarily from the fact that the Kremlin never assumed that such an attack could take place (which is strange since this option existed from the very beginning of the war; I even suggested in 2022 that Ukraine should attack Belarus, which could be counted as an aggressor power since it allowed Putin’s troops to use its territory for the invasion and thus became a legitimate target, but appears much weaker internally than Russia is).
As the surprise effect evaporates, Russian defense will become stronger due to reinforcementsand if the Ukrainians increase their pressure, Putin can call for a universal mobilization because an aggression against the Russian Federation is taking place – if it happens, I will rather suggest that the mobilization effort could be successful and will not cause protests throughout the country, so the president’s statement Volodymyr Zelenskythat Putin’s government began with a “Kursk” (the submarine that sank in August 2000 in the North Sea) and will end with another Kursk seems quite premature.
It can therefore be argued that the invasion of Russian territory is a timely but risky venture. Since Putin does not want to “disturb” his subjects and apparently has no intention of calling for another mobilization, It might be a good time now to start some kind of ceasefire negotiations.but I doubt that if they don’t start, a better time will come for them soon…
Vladislav Inozemtsev He is the director of the Center for Postindustrial Studies in Moscow.