Last October, an investigation by Financial Times revealed how Russia had reduced the rate of interceptions of ballistic missiles 9K720 Iskander M and Kh-47M2 Kinzhalthis one is also hypersonic, thanks to improvements in its guidance software. Specifically, Ukraine went from 37% of successful interceptions in August to 6% in September. However, that trend now appears to be reversing thanks to the use of a new electronic warfare system against Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missiles which causes them to crash at the speed of Mach 10 in the open field, rather than against their targets. And without Ukraine having to spend the very expensive missiles Patriot against them.
The electronic warfare system is achieving it Lime of Ukrainian unity Night Watchusing a technique known as spoofing (signal spoofing), as reported by Forbes. ‘So far there are 21 Kinzhal missiles neutralized’a Night Watch source told the outlet, noting that they were waiting to confirm two others to add them to the count.
Kinzhal hypersonic missile
The Kinzhal is one of Russia’s star weapons. Moscow presents it as a hypersonic missile capable of overcoming any Western air defense. It is launched from fighter planes, reaching speeds of up to Mach 10 (more than 12,000 km/h) and combines a quasi-ballistic trajectory with maneuverability in the final phase. On paper, it is a system designed to destroy highly defended high-value targets, not to end up buried in a crop field.
According to its manufacturers, the Kinzhal has a probable circular error (CEP) of about 10 meters. That is, they must impact less than 10 meters from the target. This precision is essential because the Kinzhal, unlike intercontinental ballistic missiles, does not carry a nuclear warhead but rather a conventional charge of about half a ton of explosive. With a warhead that size, a deviation of tens or hundreds of meters is synonymous with failure.
Ukrainian sources do not publish where the missiles land, but on November 10 a well-known Russian military blogger released satellite images of recent craters attributed to Kinzhal missiles with deviations of up to 144 meters from the target. In the case of bunkers, buried command centers or other critical infrastructure, this deviation is enough to leave the target intact.
Inertial and satellite guidance system
The key is how the missile is guided. The Kinzhal combines an inertial navigation system (INS)based on accelerometers that calculate position by measuring displacements and accelerations, with satellite navigation. The INS has the great advantage of be immune to external interferencebecause it does not depend on radio signals. But it has the disadvantage that its accuracy degrades over time. In long range missiles, the error can grow to exceed a hundred meters.
To correct this drift, Kinzhal resorts to the satellite constellation GLONASSthe Russian equivalent of GPS United States. The onboard receiver compares the signal from several satellites and continuously corrects the position calculated by the INS. This combination gives the necessary precision to hit the targets, but, unlike the INS, Satellite navigation can be interfered with or manipulated from the ground.
Until now, Russia has tried to shield itself from interference using advanced receivers such as the Kometawhich they use controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPA) with multiple elements. These systems allow interfering signals to be ‘cancelled’, so that only legitimate satellite signals are taken into account. During the war, configurations with four antenna elements have been changed to others with eight, twelve and even 16, making the work of Ukrainian electronic warfare equipment more expensive and complicated.
The Lima electronic warfare system
The new Lima system attacks from another flank. Instead of simply blocking the satellite signal (jamming), it uses spoofing and, instead of noise, emits false signals that imitate those of the satellite navigation system and provide erroneous coordinates. The receiver of the missile believes he is receiving legitimate data and calculates a position that does not correspond to reality. From his point of view, everything is working normally.
Night Watch sources assure that the Lima system is capable of creating a wide navigation denial zone, within which all GLONASS-dependent missiles can be affected at the same time. Operators transmit a signal in binary format that, in certain flight modes, causes anomalies in one of the missile’s channels. The autopilot tries to compensate for these abnormal ‘readings’ and starts ignoring other sensors.
‘At that point, the navigation loop is essentially “blind” and there is nothing left to correct the error.’says Night Watch’s source.
The result can be a relatively small mistake -an impact tens or a hundred meters from the target- or a big detour. Even if the missile uses a less precise system like the INS, it can avoid deviating tens of kilometers, but it is not enough to achieve the goal.
Ukrainian sources point to the case of a Kinzhal who would have ended up impacting 200 km away from the airfield it was supposed to destroy. In other cases, the missiles would have fallen without detonatingsomething that is also attributed to the action of electronic warfare by forcing warhead security modes.
Western electronic warfare experts consider these stories credible and point to a logical evolution in the duel between guidance systems and countermeasures. Russia only manufactures between 10 and 15 Kinzhal per monthso that if a significant fraction of them are lost in empty fields, the strategic impact of the system is considerably reduced despite the drop in interceptions with Patriot or other anti-aircraft systems.
Large scale spoofing
Ukraine itself has been experimenting with large-scale spoofing for some time. The system Pokrovadeployed since 2024, has been used to divert drones Shahid of Iranian design, also equipped with satellite navigation receivers and advanced antennas. Lima would be, according to Ukrainian sources, a more refined development of this approach, intended specifically for dealing with high-speed ballistic and cruise missiles.
None of this means that the Kinzhal is no longer a threat. Electronic warfare is a game of cat and mouse and each new interference technique is followed by a generation of more spoofing-resistant receivers and algorithms. Western companies are already working on systems capable of detecting when a navigation signal has been manipulated and correcting it, and it is reasonable to assume that Russia will do the same to protect its most advanced missiles.